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Gerrymandering Revisited—Searching for a Standard
Theodore R. Boehm*
I.

DISTRICTING IN A NUTSHELL

History is replete with examples of legislative districts created to assure the
election or defeat of specific candidates or to preserve the domination of a majority
party. By the time John Kennedy sought the Presidency in 1960, perpetuation of
incumbent interests had taken the form of inaction as well as affirmative jiggering of
district lines. Many states had not redistricted for decades despite massive shifts in
concentrations of population, generally from small towns and rural areas to cities and
their suburbs. In the most egregious example of malapportionment, Dallas’
Congressional district cast five times the votes of smallest Texas district.1 The 1960
election in Indiana was conducted using maps that had been created in 1921. Only
half as many people voted in the largely rural Ninth District as did in Marion County,
which included the pre-UniGov city of Indianapolis and was a single congressional
district.2
Until the 1960s, the federal courts had heeded Justice Frankfurter’s caution
against venturing into the “political thicket” and declared these practices, however
objectionable, beyond judicial scrutiny.3 But in 1962 the Supreme Court opened the
courthouse door to constitutional challenges to congressional districts.4 A nationwide
frenzy of districting litigation ensued. Within two years, Wesberry v. Sanders5
imposed rough equivalence of district population in congressional races, and Reynolds
v. Sims6 did the same for elections of both houses of state legislatures.
Equal population requirements proved to impose no restraint on the ability of
legislators to keep a heavy thumb on the scale in their own elections. Manipulation
of legislative districts for the benefit of a favored party or individual candidate is
nothing new. But modern technology has substantially facilitated a temporary
majority’s ability to perpetuate its dominance of a legislative body. This art has now
advanced to the point that the legislators in dozens of states can join the North
Carolina state senator who famously observed in 1998: “We are in the business of
rigging elections.”7
*
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Partner, Hoover Hull Turner LLP, Indianapolis, IN. Mr. Boehm is a former Justice of the Indiana
Supreme Court and was the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in Davis v. Bandemer, discussed infra.
Benjamin J. Gunthrie, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, Statistics of the Presidential and
Congressional Election of November 8, 1960 44 (1961), http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electioninfo
/1960election.pdf.
Id.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting a North Carolina state
senator).
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Chief Justice Earl Warren considered the redistricting cases the most
important of his time leading the Supreme Court because the effects of reshaped
federal and state legislatures reverberated across every aspect of American life.8 We
are potentially on the cusp of an equally significant ruling that gerrymanders violate
the Federal Constitution.
II.

GERRYMANDERS: A PROBLEM WITH MANY DIMENSIONS

There are many reasons to adjust district lines to achieve some electoral result.
For purposes of this discussion, a gerrymander is an attempt to assure a political
party’s domination of a legislative chamber by creating as many districts as possible
that are likely or certainly safe for the party. This means creating a majority of
districts at least fifty-five percent favorable to the party and concentrating or
“packing” the opposition’s voters into a minority of districts.9
Voter confusion. Complaints about gerrymandering, including those from some
courts, take a variety of forms. Early attacks, including the Boston Globe’s, which
coined the term “Gerry-mander” in 1812, focus on “traditional” districting principles
that essentially turn on the appearance of the district on the map.10 Even today,
Justice John Paul Stevens advocates a federal constitutional amendment to constrain
mapmakers by requiring districts to be compact and contiguous and to justify any
deviation by adherence to existing political boundaries, such as county and municipal
borders.11 There is merit in requiring district lines to follow boundaries that define
units of municipal government. Districts that follow no pattern and have irregular
shapes conforming to no widely understood demarcations are confusing and make it
difficult for voters to identify their representative. But with today’s very sophisticated
software and the ability to manipulate precinct level voting data, the constraints of
compactness, contiguity, and adherence to other boundaries are not sufficient to
prevent an effective gerrymander. And voter confusion is only one of the many
reasons why gerrymanders are undesirable.
Conflict of interest. A more fundamental problem with a gerrymander is that
it is a law passed by vote of the majority party and opposed by the minority members.
Virtually all of the approving legislators have a blatant conflict of interest. Of course,
many laws are voted upon by legislators with some self-interest at stake, and
legislators are generally free to vote for legislation that may benefit them
individually—for example, by favoring an industry in which they have an interest.
Particularly in states with part-time legislatures, this practice is considered the
necessary cost of a democratic form of government. In the case of most legislation, the
judgment of disinterested legislators is considered a sufficient restraint on abuse of
8
9
10
11

Ed Cray, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 437 (1997).
See infra note 35.
See Christopher Klein, ‘A New Species of Monster’, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 10, 2011), https://www.bostonglobe.
com/ideas/2011/09/10/new-species-monster/TRpFHqNSEeLV2OGlUi1HyI/ story.html.
See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION
HARDCOVER (2014).
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principle. But a gerrymander is qualitatively different from most other legislation.
The majority-party legislators who support a gerrymander are precisely the favored
few the law benefits. By perpetuating their majority party domination, it assures
many of the majority a shot at a committee chair, and gives most of them a friendly
district for reelection. In that respect, those few citizens, and only they, are the direct
beneficiaries of the law they are imposing on all others.
Unrepresentative legislative bodies. A third obvious issue raised by a
gerrymander is it unfairly skews election results as between the parties. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly found no constitutional right to proportional
representation—that is, elected representatives need not be in proportion to the votes
cast for their respective candidates across the state.12 But a map that purposely packs
voters of one party into a minority of districts is as pernicious in effect as patently
unlawful practices such as intimidation of minority party voters at the polls or
creating districts of substantially unequal population. In that sense a gerrymander
is unfair to the minority party. But apart from any unfairness to a political group, a
gerrymander produces a legislature that is not representative of the general voter
population. Successful candidates in primary elections are predominantly those who
appeal to their party’s most enthusiastic supporters who tend to positions many
regard as extreme. The general election in most districts of a gerrymandered map
merely ratifies the election of the winners of the majority party primary, resulting in
a legislature that underrepresents the views of moderates and centrists.
Polarized legislative bodies. Fourth, a gerrymander produces a legislature
composed of mostly safe districts for one party or the other. In those districts the
primary election becomes the only significant event, and the successful candidate is
one who runs to the center of his party’s voters. The result is a legislature with few
centrists and with few who need to appeal to a broad range of constituents. Many
argue that this in turn contributes to polarization and gridlock.13 Regardless of the
validity of that charge, at a minimum the legislature does not reflect the attitudes of
the electorate as a whole by, in effect, underrepresenting the vast political center.
Disenfranchised Independents and minority party adherents. Fifth,
gerrymanders in many states, including Indiana, effectively disenfranchise
Independents and third party candidates in most districts. By creating large numbers
of districts as nearly impregnable fortresses of one of the two major parties, a
gerrymander reduces the general election to a pro forma ratification of the primary.
The result is that Independents and third party adherents in those safe districts have
no meaningful role in the selection of the legislature. The extent of that consequence
may depend on state laws and to some extent the voting practices of the state. Some
12
13

See e.g. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; see also ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET. AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA (2004).
For a discussion of this debate, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011); But see Nolan McCarty, Keith T.
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009).

62

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[5:1

states have “open” primaries and experience significant crossover voting in the
primary elections. Others, including Indiana, have some deterrent to adherents of a
different party, or even genuinely undecided voters, participating in a party’s primary
election.14 Even if there is no consequence to voting other than as permitted by
statute, a voter’s choice of party in the primary is a matter of public record, and that
alone undoubtedly deters many who do not want to appear to affiliate with a party
that is not of their choice. The constitutional right of free association includes the
right not to associate, and those who do not wish to identify themselves as Republican
or Democrat have a right to do that.
Voter alienation. Sixth, gerrymanders discourage all voters from participation
in the election. The extent to which gerrymanders contribute to voter apathy and
distrust of government is for others to analyze. But the contribution of gerrymanders
to the health of the body politic can’t be positive. Because the result in the general
election is preordained by each district’s majority party primary, supporters of the
district’s minority party have less incentive to bother to vote, and less interest in the
strengths and weaknesses of the candidates. Gerrymanders produce a number of
uncontested legislative races across the state. Reduced voter turnout is less felt in
presidential years but nonetheless significant. To compound this problem, the
spectacle of legislators choosing their voters rather than voters choosing their
representatives only fosters cynical disrespect for the process.
In sum, a gerrymander produces a number of destructive and anti-democratic
consequences, but it serves only the private interests of the dominant political party
and, more specifically, its legislators.
III.

GERRYMANDERS IN THE SUPREME COURT

In a few states voters have taken these problems in their own hands and
wrested the process from the legislature’s grasp, enacting a bipartisan approach to
districting by direct voter initiative. But in the many states without voter initiatives
and in those whose state constitution expressly vests districting power in the
legislature, there is little evidence that the state legislatures will adopt any
meaningful reform of state legislative districts. And because the state legislatures
draw the Congressional maps, without reform of the state process, we can expect
minimal progress in Congressional districting.15 When control of the General
Assembly was divided, the two parties confirmed skepticism of legislative relief as to
Indiana’s state maps. The majority in each house drew a map to its liking for itself
14

15

In Indiana, any voter in the precinct may challenge an attempt to vote in a party’s primary. IND. CODE
ANN. § 3-10-1-6 (LexisNexis 2011) provides that a voter is “eligible” to vote in the primary if the voter
voted in the last general for a majority of the party’s candidates, or did not vote in the last general, but
intends to vote for a majority of that party’s candidates in the upcoming general election. How this works
in practice is not clear, and may vary across the state. In fact it seems clear that in some recent elections
there was some crossover voting without any consequence to the voters who crossed party lines.
Indiana has a form of bipartisan districting for congressional elections if the legislature fails to agree on
congressional districts. This was put in place in 1988 when the two major parties each controlled one
house of the state legislature and a deadlock in passage of a congressional map was foreseeable. It has
never been used. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (LexisNexis 2011).
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and approved the other house’s self-drawn plan. The result was a decade-long
bipartisan gerrymander favoring Democrats in the House and Republicans in the
Senate.
As explained in Part II, federal constitutional precedent offers some hope of
judicial cabining of gerrymanders. And state legislatures create both their own and
congressional maps, but they more directly labor under a conflict of interest in
drawing their own districts. The odds seem good that reform of state legislatures will
lead to fair congressional districting. All of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that
a federal constitutional challenge to gerrymandering of state legislatures offers the
most likely prospect of assuring that we have functioning state and federal legislative
branches that are broadly representative of the electorate and not only the zealous
adherents of the two major parties.
Redistricting cases are heard by three-judge courts and appeals go directly to
the Supreme Court. Beginning in the 1980s and recurring sporadically since,
challenges to the constitutionality of gerrymandering have been raised, but as of this
writing none have been ultimately successful.16 Few would dispute the importance
of the questions whether a court can strike down a legislative map that meets the
population equality test and does not violate the Voting Rights Act, as well as what
a successful plaintiff must show to achieve that result. Some likely critical issues,
notably partisan intent to disadvantage a voting group, are essentially factual, so a
successful trial court ruling will be a leg up; but the courts have yet to establish an
attainable legal standard a plaintiff must meet. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that
any attempt to analyze the prospects of a successful challenge must start and end
with the Supreme Court of the United States.
Davis v. Bandemer (1986)17 The first pure gerrymandering case to reach the
Supreme Court came from Indiana. In Davis v. Bandemer, the three-judge trial court,
by 2-1 decision, had agreed with the plaintiffs that the redistricting plan enacted after
the 1980 census violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs were Democratic voters from several parts of the state who
claimed that the map was a law that was intended to, and did, disadvantage an
identifiable group, in this case Democrats, and was justified by no legitimate
governmental interest. Plaintiffs presented this claim as grounded in established
Equal Protection doctrine, including principles that “the state must govern
impartially”18 and legislative classifications must be “rational” (that is, must “serve
important governmental purposes”).19 They bolstered their claim with language from
several Supreme Court cases affirming that laws having “a real and appreciable
impact on the exercise of the franchise” must “serve important governmental
objectives.” 20 Plaintiffs also argued that the law was intentionally designed to injure
16
17
18
19
20

Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 831, 839–49 (2015).
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
Id.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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supporters of a political party, which is a group of citizens entitled to be free from
discriminatory legislation.21
The defendants responded that the issue was not justiciable because there
were no judicially manageable standards, redistricting was inherently a political
issue, and the Equal Protection Clause conferred no group right on political parties
or their supporters. Because at that time the nationwide effect of curtailing
gerrymandering would have benefited Republicans more than Democrats, an unusual
array of amici curiae appeared. Briefs supporting the plaintiffs were filed by the
ACLU, Common Cause, and The Republican National Committee. The California
State Assembly, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and
the California Democratic Congressional Delegation supported the defendants.
The Supreme Court reversed by a seven-two vote with no majority opinion. A
four-justice plurality (White, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun) held the
plaintiff’s claims justiciable. The plurality quoted at length from Baker v. Carr, which
opened the door to challenges to unequal populations and limited nonjusticiable
“political questions” to six areas described collectively as those “essentially a function
of separation of powers.”22 Among these are matters lacking “judicially discoverable
and manageable standards.”23 The plurality agreed that there was no “arithmetic
presumption” to identify a constitutional violation, but rejected the claim that this
established a lack of judicially manageable standards.24 The plurality noted that
when Baker held challenges to unequal population justiciable, the “one-person-onevote”25 rule had not yet been devised.
Turning to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, the plurality noted that in
multimember districting cases the Court had “repeatedly stated that districting that
would ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population’ would raise a constitutional question.”26 The
plurality agreed with the district court that plaintiffs were required to prove both
intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group. The plurality readily accepted the district court’s
finding of intentional discrimination. The maps had been designed in secret with the
aid of computer consultants and were moved through the legislative process through
21
22

23
24
25
26

E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 327, 363 (1976).
Davis, 478 U.S.at 121 ("It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more
elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
Id. at 217.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 119 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)) (emphasis removed).
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“vehicle” bills which had no content. The maps were first revealed to the minority
members or the public in the last days of the legislative session. The final approval
was by unanimous Republican majorities in both houses of the Indiana General
Assembly over the dissenting votes of all Democratic members.
Despite the partisan motivation, the plurality found the proof of lasting effect
insufficient.27 The plurality would require proof “that the challenged legislative plan
has had or will have effects that are sufficiently serious to require intervention by the
federal courts in state reapportionment decisions.”28 The trial of the case was held in
1984 before the election of that year.29 The only evidence of the effect of the maps was
the 1982 election, in which Democratic candidates received 51.9% of the votes cast
for the Indiana House but elected only 43 of 100 Representatives.30 The plurality held
that one election was not sufficient to establish a lasting injury.
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and future Chief Justice
Rehnquist, would reverse for lack of justiciability.31 Justice O’Connor also found no
right of a political group to assert a constitutional claim.32 In her view, the racial
discrimination cases were not applicable precedent because court intervention to
address racial discrimination was justified by the Fourteenth Amendment.33
Justice O’Connor supported her conclusions with two factual assertions that
time has proved questionable. First, gerrymandering has not proven to be “selflimiting,” as she suggested based on an academic study published in 1984.34 To the
contrary, it has metastasized. To use the Indiana example again, the 1981 map
challenged in Bandemer created fifty-six House districts that were considered by its
sponsoring legislators to be “safe” for Republicans, and the election results bore out
their confidence.35 The 2011 Indiana gerrymander produced at most five competitive
Senate districts and perhaps ten competitive House districts in the Indiana state
maps. Thirty-seven Indiana House races were uncontested in the 2014 general
election. Congressional districts across the nation show the same trend. Few studies
conclude that more than 35 of the 435 districts today are competitive.
Second, Justice O’Connor found no proof “that political gerrymandering is an
evil that cannot be checked or cured by the people or by the parties themselves.”36 As
already noted, in a few states, including Justice O’Connor’s Arizona, a voter initiative
has been invoked by “the people” to address gerrymandering. But in a large majority
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36

Id.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 181–182.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 144–61.
Id.
Id. at 152.
The district court found a district “competitive” if neither major party had more than 55% of the votes for
the two major party candidates. This standard of measuring “safe” and “competitive” districts was
accepted by the district court and endorsed by experts for both sides. As will be elaborated below, it has
stood the test of time. If one party has 55% of the vote, the other party must increase its 45% by 10% of
the two-party total, or 11.1% of its votes. History has shown this occurs rarely, hence a district with one
party whose candidate received 55% or greater in the district is considered “safe” for that party. Id.
Id. at 152.
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of states a voter initiative is not available, and, as described in Part I, temporary
legislative majorities across the nation have typically sought to solidify a stranglehold
on the maps.
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented.37 They would accept
Justice Fortas’ definition of gerrymandering as “deliberate and arbitrary distortion
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes” and
would affirm the district court’s judgment.38 They pointed out that some district lines
may be distorted to achieve a partisan advantage, but the effect is statewide. The
dissent would look to several factors in evaluating whether there was deliberate
manipulation of districts without legitimate justification. These factors include
whether the legislative process itself exhibited partisan motivation (which the
plurality also found), disregard of traditional political boundaries, irregular shaped
districts, and the absence of any considerations beyond partisan advantage.
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) Following the redistricting to adjust for the 2000
census, plaintiffs tried again, this time in Pennsylvania. Vieth v. Jubelirer39 was
appealed to the Supreme Court after the three-judge court dismissed plaintiffs’
political gerrymandering claim. Again, the Supreme Court produced no majority
opinion.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and
Thomas, argued that the Bandemer holding of justiciability should be revisited and
overruled. The plurality first noted that Article 1, §4 of the Constitution allows
Congress to “make or alter” Congressional districts as drawn by states; and in 1842,
Congress had acted to require single member districts of “contiguous territory”40; and
in 1872, Congress had imposed a requirement of equal population.41 Since 1911, only
the single member district requirement survives.
The plurality then turned to the language from Baker v. Carr to describe
nonjusticiable “political questions” and quoted verbatim in Bandemer. The plurality
labeled them “six independent tests” of nonjusticiability and focused on the second:
“a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” which imposes the
requirement that, unlike legislatures, courts are to impose law only if “principled,
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”42 The plurality noted that although
lower courts had entertained claims of unconstitutional gerrymandering, none had
granted relief, and no plaintiff had satisfied the Bandemer plurality’s standard.43 The
Vieth plurality described the Bandemer standard in various ways, both as to
individual districts and as to the state as a whole. But the plurality did not describe
it, as it might fairly be summarized, as a requirement of a showing of a lasting
impairment of voting strength. Rather, the plurality attacks the Bandemer approach
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 161.
Id. at 164.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267.
5 Stat. 491 (1842).
12 Stat 572 (1872).
Vieth, 541 U.S.at 277–78.
Id. at 279–80.
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as confused because the plurality saw no clear way to identify the predominant
purpose as between the likely ever-present partisan considerations and other
considerations such as compactness, adherence to political boundaries, etc.44 But this
is a fact question, as later cases will hold, and the evidence in virtually every
gerrymandering case demonstrates to any objective observer that the predominant
motivation for the maps as a whole was preservation of the dominant party’s majority
status. Indeed, all six Justices of the Bandemer court who addressed the question
found it obvious.
The Vieth plaintiffs argued for a standard that would require proof of (1)
systematic “cracking and packing” the minority and (2) inability of the minority to
attain a majority of the seats even if it obtained a majority of the votes.45 The
plurality viewed this as a claim that groups have a right to proportional
representation, a right that several precedents have rejected.46 The plurality
understood the plaintiffs’ measure of the minority party’s vote to be based on
statewide races and responded that this measure was unworkable because candidates
of both major parties had won statewide races. The plurality also accepted the view
that “there is no statewide vote” for districted legislative offices, citing two relatively
dated academic sources.47 Finally, the plurality noted that “natural” packing occurs
from the fact that some groups, notably Democrats in cities, are more densely
clustered, and therefore a neutrally drawn map would be biased against them.
Justice Stevens agreed that statewide claims are nonjusticiable, but individual
district claims were cognizable by analogy to racial gerrymanders, which had been
held unconstitutional.48
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, found the Bandemer standard too
demanding and would later find some gerrymanders unconstitutional, but he would
limit the plaintiffs to district-specific claims. Souter would allow a claim based on a
burden-shifting process patterned on those used in employment and housing
discrimination cases. If a plaintiff’s district were manipulated to the disadvantage of
the plaintiff’s group, the defendants would be required to justify the district by
objectives other than naked partisan advantage.
Justice Breyer dissented, viewing the partisan gerrymandering as “unjustified
entrenchment,” and he set out several scenarios that he considered sufficient to
support a claim. As might be expected, all of this came down to Justice Kennedy,
whose views on this matter will likely be dispositive, absent a change in the Court.
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the plaintiffs had not set out a
“manageable and workable standard” to evaluate political gerrymanders, but he was
not willing to conclude that none could be found. He therefore formed a majority to
44
45
46
47

48

Id. at 284.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 289 (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in
the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1985); see also PETER SCHUCK,
Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial Solution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING
AND THE COURTS 240, 241 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630 (1993).
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affirm dismissal of the Vieth complaint, but left for future resolution whether a
majority of the Court could find a manageable standard. Interestingly, Justice
Kennedy introduced the concept that the First Amendment, whose right of
association protects the formation of political parties, also protects “representational
rights.” And he suggested that if a gerrymander “had the purpose and effect of
imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters, the First Amendment may
offer a sounder and more prudential basis for intervention than does the Equal
Protection Clause.”49 In his view, the ultimate constitutional issue is whether
political considerations “burden representational rights,”50 and a manageable
standard requires a means to “measure the effect of the apportionment . . . to conclude
that the State did impose a burden.”51
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)52 dealt with the
Texas legislature’s redrawing of Congressional districts in mid-decade to override a
plan devised by a court after the initial apportionment was found to violate the
population requirement. The plaintiffs alleged both Voting Rights Act violations and
unconstitutional political gerrymandering. Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-justice
majority, putting to rest the tenuous claim advanced by a few courts53 that Vieth had
held gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. Describing his own deciding vote, Justice
Kennedy stated: “The Vieth plurality would have held such challenges nonjusticiable
political questions, but a majority declined to do so.”54 In a portion of his opinion,
writing for himself, Justice Kennedy succinctly described a successful partisan
gerrymandering claim as one that imposes “a burden, as measured by a reliable
standard, on the complainants’ representational rights.”55
A majority found the new legislative plan violated the Voting Rights Act by
splitting a Latino majority district. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both
addressing redistricting cases for the first time, affirmed dismissal of the
gerrymandering claim for failure to offer a reliable standard but expressed no opinion
on justiciability. Justices Scalia and Thomas adhered to their view that the
gerrymandering claim was nonjusticiable.
Some observers took LULAC as indicating the Court’s receptivity to revisiting
Vieth and Bandemer,56 but until recently, few plaintiffs have taken up the
challenge.57

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 315.
See League of United Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843, 855 (Ct.
App. 2005); see Benisek v. Mack, 11 F.Supp.3d 516, 524–25 (D. Md. 2014).
Perry, 548 U.S. at 400.
Id. at 404.
Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007).
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 16 at 832.
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TEA LEAVES IN SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

The Supreme Court has not entertained a direct constitutional challenge to a
gerrymander since LULAC. But the Court has addressed several cases on the
periphery of that issue that may offer insight into the Justices’ current thinking.
By the time Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission58 reached the Court in 2015, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor had
replaced Justices Souter and Stevens. All indications are that this had no effect on
the 4-4 division that gave Justice Kennedy the deciding vote in Veith and LULAC.
Arizona, like California and some other western states, allows voters to enact
laws by popular vote, and Arizona voters had used that process to transfer the
districting function from the state legislature to a bipartisan commission. The
Arizona Legislature sued to preserve its districting prerogative, claiming that the
Elections Clause of the Federal Constitution required that districts be drawn by the
state legislature. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor
and Kagan, held that if a state chooses to vest legislative power in the people as a
whole, it does not violate the Elections Clause.59 Ginsburg’s opinion for this fivejustice majority quoted from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Veith: “‘Partisan
gerrymanders,’ this Court has recognized ‘are incompatible with democratic
principles.’”60 She summarized the state of play on partisan gerrymandering: “The
plurality [in Veith] held the matter nonjusticiable. Justice Kennedy found no
standard workable in that case, but “left open the possibility that a suitable standard
might be identified in later litigation.”61 Like LULAC, this language, not necessary
to resolve the Elections Clause issue, can be read as an open invitation to reopen the
search for a suitable standard.
Finally, shortly after the death of Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer writing for a
unanimous Court, decided Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission.62 In that case, Arizona legislators and their allies renewed their attempt
to regain the keys to the legislative fortress, this time contending that the bipartisan
commission had drawn its map to favor Democrats, and therefore the population
variations in the state legislative maps, though within tolerances acceptable if
justified by legitimate redistricting principles, were based on illegitimate
considerations and were unconstitutional.
The Court unanimously rejected the factual premise that the commission had
been motivated by partisan considerations, accepting the district court’s factual
finding that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was the reason for the
commission’s accepting population deviations within the ten percent tolerance
allowed by precedent. The unanimous opinion concluded by “assuming, without
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Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2652 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 2658 (citing Veith, 541 U.S. at 316).
Id. (citing Veith, 541 U.S. at 281, 317).
993 F.Supp.2d 1042 (D.Ariz. 2014).
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deciding, that partisanship is an illegitimate redistricting factor,” plaintiffs failed to
show it.
V.

SEARCHING FOR STANDARDS

Gerrymanderers typically do their work as soon as a new census is available
and create hypothetical models based on past elections. Essentially the same
techniques adopted by the Indiana Republican majority and its highly paid
consultants in 1981 are in use today, though refined and improved by vastly greater
computing power and the ease with which graphic displays of districts can be easily
manipulated to test a tweak here or there to a given district. Repeated use and
refinement of this technique at considerable expense demonstrates it is believed
reliable and effective. The results in most states are maps with all the attendant
problems identified in Part I. The need for judicial intervention cannot be overstated.
Voter initiatives are not available in most states, and the legislative branch,
inherently locked in a conflict of interest of monumental proportions, has shown itself
incapable of reform in almost every state.
A majority of the current Court is now on board with Justice Kennedy’s
summary of the situation: gerrymandering claims are justiciable, but no manageable
standard to measure the burden on representative rights has yet been shown.
Gerrymandering is thus now in the same place districts of unequal populations were
after Baker and before Wesberry and Reynolds. Plaintiffs are now launching a new
round of constitutional challenges attempting to establish such a standard, and some
may reach the Supreme Court in the next term.
The Efficiency Gap as a Measureable Standard. Whitford v. Nichol63 was tried
in May 2016, and is before the three-judge court for decision as of this writing. The
court had previously denied defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint and for
summary judgment, carefully reserving for trial whether the plaintiffs’ proof would
be sufficient to establish a claim. The Whitford plaintiffs alleged an unconstitutional
gerrymander of the Wisconsin state House and Senate.64 They proceeded on the
assumption that such a claim required proof of partisan motivation and a
measurable, material, and lasting effect on the voting power of the minority party.
Partisan motivation relied in part on evidence developed in a prior case which
had attacked the same maps based on population deviations of less than one
percent.65 The plaintiffs there contended that even these usually permissible
deviations were unconstitutional because the map was drawn with partisan intent.
The three-judge court in that prior case described the denials of partisan intent from
the legislative staffers involved, some of whom also testified in Whitford, as “almost
laughable,”66 but dismissed the complaint because the population deviations were de
minimis.
63
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No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47048 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 7, 2016).
Id. at 918.
Baldus v. Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
Id. at 851.
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The Whitford plaintiffs presented evidence of the legislative process similar to
that found sufficient by six justices in Bandemer—secrecy in developing the maps,
rushed legislative process driven by party-line voting, outside consultants testing
various maps for partisan bias based on prior election returns, and statements of the
drafters or their consultants.67 They offered the “efficiency gap” proposed by
Stephanopoulos and McGee68 as a measure of partisan effect to meet a manageable
legal standard. The efficiency gap measures the difference in the number of “wasted
votes” for candidates of the two major parties. Wasted votes are votes cast for a losing
candidate, plus all votes for a winner above the number required to win the district.
The efficiency gap is the difference between the statewide totals of wasted votes for
the two parties expressed as a percentage (positive or negative) of the total votes for
the two parties’ candidates for the legislative body. Here is a simple example of the
efficiency gap in a hypothetical election of a nine-district legislative body with 900
voters, 450 of each party. Its map looks like this, with the most recent party votes in
each district:
55-45 Red

55-45 Red

55-45 Red

60-40 Blue

60-40 Blue

60-40 Blue

55-45 Red

55-45 Red

55-45 Red

In this example six districts would be considered “safe” for Red and three “safe”
for Blue. The efficiency gap is 16.7%, calculated as follows (for simplicity ignoring the
one vote more than 50%, which is immaterial in the real world where districts contain
thousands of voters):69
3
40
60
120
180
120
9
3x40=120 3x10=30
Total votes:
450
450
Total wasted votes:
150
300
Efficiency Gap= (300-150)/900=150/900= +16.67% in favor of Red
-16.67% disadvantage to Blue

67
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69

Whitford, 151 F.Supp.3d at 918; Davis, 478 U.S. at 109.
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 16 (The article was widely circulated among academics and
advocates concerned with redistricting issues for some time before its publication).
See id. at 18 (In the real world, districts are not exactly equal in number of votes cast, so adding the
wasted votes by district is tedious. A simpler and quicker method of calculating the efficiency gap in a
two party race is ½ of a party’s seat advantage minus 2 times its vote advantage, with both advantages
expressed as percentages. In this hypothetical Red captured 6/9 or 66.7% of the seats, which is 33.3%
more than Blue’s 33.3%. The two parties each received 450 votes, so Red’s vote advantage is 0%. The
efficiency gap is ½ of 33.3% or 16.7%).
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In simple terms, the efficiency gap is an index of the relative legislative muscle
the two parties get from each vote and how much the districting dilutes the vote of
one party. It measures the presence in a map of the goal that a gerrymanderer sets
out to accomplish: “pack” as many of the opposing party’s voters as possible into
districts that the opponents will win anyway, and “crack” the opponent’s votes in
competitive districts down to levels that assure success for the gerrymanderer.
The efficiency gap thus supplies the “measurable” component of a manageable
standard of unconstitutional gerrymandering, analogous to the equal population
requirements of Wesberry and Reynolds. It also is relevant, but not sufficient, to
establish partisan motivation.
Proof of a material and lasting burden. The challenge raised by the Bandemer
plurality and by the Court’s later demands for a manageable standard is to establish
that the maps will create a lasting and material impairment of the minority party’s
representational rights. These requirements boil down to showing how much of an
efficiency gap revealed by the first actual election under a new map (or by a
hypothetical election using the new districts measured by the voting history from past
election) is sufficient to demonstrate a probable, lasting material impairment of
representational rights.
To establish reliability and durability, the Whitford plaintiffs did not rely
solely on common sense or the fact that the defendants spent over $200,000 to
generate their maps.70 Plaintiffs offered two basic means of testing the durability of
an efficiency gap of a given magnitude. One expert testified that he had analyzed a
large number of elections and found that a map exhibiting an efficiency gap of seven
percent or more in the most recent election would continue the dominant party as the
majority in the legislative chamber throughout a decade in 95% of the cases. The
plaintiffs argue that this finding and other statistical showings establish to a high
degree of probability that the degree of Republican bias in the Wisconsin map will
enable it to retain majority control throughout the decade, thus establishing a
material and lasting impairment of the minority party voters’ representational
rights.
Mopping up. There are a number of subsidiary issues that are often debated
and cloud the issue. It is true that in some areas, notably cities with large minority
populations, Democrats tend to be clustered more densely than Republicans.71 The
degree to which that is truer of Democrats (in cities) than Republicans (in suburbs)
is hotly debated. Very likely, however, any “natural” bias rarely exceeds low single
digits, and never approaches the thirteen percent efficiency gap that the Whitford
plaintiffs allege. Similarly, there is some skirmishing over how to account for the
efficiency gap in uncontested districts, which are numerous in some heavily
gerrymandered states. Some hypothetical vote for the nonexistent opponent of an
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Whitford, 151 F.Supp.3d at 918.
Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral
Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 239–69 (2013).
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unopposed winner needs to be constructed.72 It is up to the political scientists to work
this out with reasonably reliable statistical analyses. There will be multiple
reasonable means of resolving these nuances, but the differences among them are
unlikely to affect the ultimate conclusion that representational rights are indeed
impaired by large efficiency gaps.
VI.

INDEPENDENTS AND MINORITY PARTIES

Finally, plaintiffs have typically asserted claims asserting denial of rights to
political parties or their supporters, and alleged that the effect of a gerrymander is
statewide. Viewed as a denial of the ability to reach majority of a chamber in the state
legislature, it seems correct that all supporters of the excluded party are wrongly
denied representation of their views, and the effect is statewide.
A qualitatively different complaint is available to Independents and thirdparty supporters. In a competitive district, they can choose between the two major
party candidates, and often affect the outcome. In a gerrymandered map, however,
up to ninety percent of the districts are virtually certain to elect the prevailing
candidate in the party dominating that district.73 As a result, at least in states with
closed primaries, Independents are effectively disenfranchised, having no say in
whom the parties nominate, and being handed the winner of the district majority. As
a result, in some districts Republicans and Independents are shut out, and in others
Democrats and Independents are excluded from a meaningful vote. Some of this
phenomenon occurs in any districting plan, but it is not unconstitutional because it
is not the product of “illegitimate” districting considerations. The Supreme Court has
assumed, without deciding, that partisan districting is “illegitimate” for purposes
justifying population deviations. If so, it seems equally illegitimate in drawing district
lines. Such an approach would create different, district-specific claims by different
groups of people in different parts of the state.
In this connection, the recent decision of the Seventh Circuit in Common Cause
Indiana v. Individual Members of the Indiana Election Commission74 is interesting.
The court unanimously affirmed the Chief Judge of the Southern District in holding
unconstitutional Marion County Indiana’s system for electing its thirty-six Superior
72
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It would seem that a hypothetical vote for the minority party that did not field a candidate could be
reasonably constructed by first determining the ratio of the total votes for the minority’s least well known
statewide candidate (examples are auditor, treasurer, secretary of state) in all legislative districts which
were contested between the two parties to the total votes for that party’s legislative candidates in those
districts, then attributing that percentage of the statewide candidate’s vote in the legislative district to
create a hypothetical anonymous minority candidate vote. This would require precinct level data on the
statewide candidate’s race to construct his/her hypothetical district vote. If that is not available, it may
be necessary to use presidential races adjusted for relative volume between them and state legislative
races. I understand statisticians may favor more sophisticated techniques, and leave that issue for the
courts to resolve.
In 2014, thirty-seven of the one hundred Indiana House seats were unopposed. The prevailing candidate
in ninety-four of hundred districts received more than fifty-five percent of the votes cast for a major party
candidate. Election Results, INDIANA ELECTION DIVISION,
http://www.in.gov/apps/sos/election/general/general2014?page=office&countyID=1&officeID=10&districtID=-1&candidate= (last updated March 11, 2015, 10:01 AM).
800 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2015).
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Court judges.75 The system was instituted in 1975 to assure partisan balance of the
trial bench in Indianapolis and only slightly tweaked since.76 Its most recent
incarnation called for each of the two major parties to nominate only half of the
number of judges whose seats were up for election in any year. Absent a write-in or
third party candidate, all primary winners were assured election in the general
election. In the forty years of this plan, only an occasional write-in or third party
candidate popped up, and none came anywhere near success.
The Seventh Circuit grounded its decision expressly in a violation of First
Amendment representational rights, holding that restricting the parties to
nominating only half the seats burdened the voting rights of the party adherents, and
also finding troublesome the disparity between the voting rights conferred on primary
voters and others.77 The scheme invalidated in Common Cause was a de jure denial
of voting rights to some, while a gerrymander can accomplish the same thing de facto.
It remains to be seen whether this approach will supplement or even displace the
conventional attack on gerrymanders as deprivations of minority party rights.
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Id. at 928.
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